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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is a case wherein Franklin Building Supply Company, Inc. (also hereinafter

referred to as "Franklin Building Supply") commenced on October 4,2011 an action against
Aaron Michael Hymas (also hereinafter referred to as "Hymas"). The basis of the action was to
seek recovery of an enormous amount of money on an open account, namely, $753,159.55
together with interest continuing to accrue at $331.22 per diem from and after September 30,

2011. (Clerk's Record on Appeal "R ", p.7, §6) The defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint
on February 2,2012. (R, pp.9-10) Defendant's Answer was a general denial of the action and
included the Affinnative Defense that the statute oflimitations had run with respect to this
obligation.

B.

Course of the Proceedings
The action commenced with the Complaint dated September 3, 2011, filed on

October 4,2011 by Franklin Building Supply Company, Inc. (R, pp. 6-8) The defendant's
Answer to Complaint dated February 1,2012 was filed on February 2,2012. (R, pp. 9-10)
Subsequent thereto, on October 29,2012, a Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the
plaintiff(R, pp. 11-12) and, in support of such, an Affidavit of Richard C. Pietrucci was filed on
October 29,2012, which included exhibits as attachments. (R, pp. 13-51) Exhibit "A" to the
Affidavit was an Application for Credit; Exhibit "B" was a Continuing Guaranty' Exhibit "c"
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was a list of invoices and invoices that were claimed to be still outstanding and needed to be
paid. Plaintiff also filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at the
same time. (R, pp. 52-58)
Defendant's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on December
4,2012. (R, pp. 59-61) Attached thereto was Defendant's First Set ofInterrogatories and

Requests for Production of Documents and the Notice of Service of Discovery (R, pp. 62-69)
which, at that point, had not been responded to. Such discovery had been outstanding since
April 12, 2012. Subsequent thereto, on December 6,2012, Plaintiff filed a response to
Defendant's Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. (R, pp. 70-84)
On January 14, 2013, a hearing was held with respect to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Court granted summary judgment. (Reporter's Transcript ofProceedings

'iTr", p. 20, Ll. 8-9) Before summary judgment was ever entered, the plaintiff had filed a
Motion to Correct Calculation of Amount Claimed Owed Plaintiff on January 22,2013. (R, pp.
85-89) In support of the Motion, it included an Affidavit of Joey Enochson in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion. (R, pp. 90-92) Thereafter, Defendant filed his Motion and Memorandum to
Reconsider Judgment on February 8, 2013. (R, pp. 93-96) It was supported by the Affidavit of
Aaron Hymas filed on that same date. (R, pp. 97-99) Also filed on February 8,2013 was a
Motion to Shorten Time. (R, pp. 100-101) It appears from the record that it was never acted
upon. On February 11, 2013 plaintiff filed an Objection to the Motion to Shorten Time and an
Affidavit of David M. Swartley in support of such. (R, pp. 102-108.) On that same day, plaintiff
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filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Judgment (R, pp. 109-122) and an
Affidavit of David M. Swartley in Support of the Response. (R, pp. 123-136)
On February 21,2013, defendant Hymas filed his Reply to Plaintiff Franklin
Building Supply Company's Response to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Judgment with
Exhibits A-E included therein (R, pp. 137-155). More specifically, Exhibit "A" was six random
invoices that were provided by the plaintiff as part of its discovery responses to the defendant;
Exhibit "B" was an application in which the plaintiff relied upon in order to claim that the
defendant as guarantor was liable; Exhibit "C" was the Articles of Dissolution of Crestwood
Construction, Inc. dated February 11, 2005; Exhibit "D" was Articles ofIncorporation of
Crestwood, Inc. dated February 11, 2005; and Exhibit "E" was a Certificate of Assumed
Business Name of Crestwood Construction, Inc. dated April 6, 2005. On February 26, 20l3, the
Plaintiff filed an Objection and Motion to Strike Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff s Response to
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Judgment. (R, pp. 156-158) On March 5, 20l3, a Notice Re:
Affidavit of Aaron Hymas in Support of Motion to Reconsider was filed. The Notice stated that
Plaintiffs response to discovery was not attached to the fax-filed Affidavit of Aaron Hymas in
Support of Motion to Reconsider dated February 7, 20l3, and was then being attached thereto,
namely, Plaintiffs Responses to Defendant Aaron Michael Hymas' First Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production of Documents dated December 5,2012. (R, pp. 159-167) On April
5,2013, by its Memorandum Decision the Court granted summary judgment to Franklin
Building Supply Company, Inc. and also denied the Motion to Reconsider. (R, pp. 168-175)
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An Amended Judgment was entered by the Court on April 8, 2013. (R, pp. 176177) An Affidavit of Aaron Michael Hymas was filed on April 26, 2013 (R, pp. 178-180);
subsequent thereto, since it appeared that Exhibits A-E had not been attached to the initial
affidavit, an Amended Affidavit of Aaron Michael Hymas was filed on April 30, 2013 to which
Exhibits A-E were attached, which were the same exhibits as noted above. (R, pp. 181-198)
Plaintiff filed on May 13, 2013 a Response to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Amended
Judgment Dated April 8,2013 and the Memorandum Decision Issued April 5, 2013 (R, pp. 199211) and the Affidavit of David M. Swartley in support ofthat Response (R, pp. 212-216).
On May 17, defendant Hymas filed a Motion to Reconsider Amended Judgment
Dated April 8, 2013 and the Memorandum Decision Issued April 5, 2013. (R, pp. 217-218)
(Summary of proceedings - R, p. 219). Ultimately the Court denied such Motion (R, pp. 228229) from which a Notice of Appeal was filed on May 20,2013 (R, pp. 220-223). An Amended
Notice of Appeal was filed on June 4,2013. (R, pp. 224-227) A Second Amended Notice of
Appeal was filed on July 3,2013 to change the name of the reporter. (R, pp. 230-233) (Notice of
Transcript Lodged - R, p. 234).
This matter is now before this Court for detennination on appeal.

C.

Concise Statement of the Facts
Franklin Building Supply Company, Inc. claimed that prior to agreeing to provide

materials and goods to Crestwood Construction, Inc., a Credit Application was prepared and
signed by Justin Walker and Aaron Hymas. The Credit Application in question provided, among
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other things, that the parties who were authorized to purchase were listed in Part G, namely,
Chris Georgson, Justin Walker and Aaron Hymas. In addition, a Continuing Guaranty was also
signed by Justin Walker and Aaron Hymas. Because of the failure to pay invoices which
commenced on, as best as can be detennined, on December 22, 2006. It was for goods which
were allegedly provided by Franklin Building Supply to Crestwood Construction, Inc. The
action was initially brought against Aaron Hymas for goods sold during the latter part of 2006
and went through sometime in the middle of2007. It appears from looking at the Affidavit of
Richard C. Pietrucci filed October 29,2012, that the invoices in question for which the plaintiff
seeks to collect appear to be on twenty (20) different accounts. (R, pp. 23-51) In each case,
there is a single page per invoice for the different accounts except on pages 49 and 50, which is a
summary of invoices.
When summary judgn1ent was filed in this matter, the response was (1) that the
statute of limitations had occurred, and (2) that without supporting infonnation as to the invoices
amount, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to detennine whether the amount claimed to be
owed by the plaintiff was in fact owed. This was also further enhanced by the fact that the Credit
Application provided the names of the authorized purchasers and, in order to prevail in a
sUll1lllary judgment, it must be demonstrated that the invoices in question were authorized by one
of the three authorized purchasers.
Furthennore, the Plaintiff indicated that he had not received the Request for
Production of Documents dated April 12, 2012, as evidenced by the Notice of Service in the
- 5-

discovery which was attached. The discovery attached and provided, among other things, that
there was a request for production of a copy of all documents that Franklin Building Supply
intended to use as exhibits in the trial of this matter. Subsequent thereto, but unbeknownst to the
counsel for the Defendant, the documentation was in fact received. This receipt of documents
occurred prior to the argument ofthe summary judgment matter.
The Court granted smmnary judgment to the Plaintiff. After which, the Court
granted smmnary judgment orally but no written order was issued. The only ruling was an oral
ruling from the Court. IImllediately thereafter on January 22, 2013, a Motion to Correct
Calculation of Amount Claimed Owed Plaintiff and an Affidavit in support of such.
Thereafter, Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to Reconsider Judgment.
It was stressed that the information was not available at the time that the Defendant responded to

the smmnary judgment. The responses were then reviewed by the Defendant and discovered that
none of the invoices were signed and, since there were many different accounts, there was no
indication that the invoices were ever delivered to Crestwood Construction, Inc. Furthermore,
the Answers to Interrogatories indicated that those invoices would be used as evidence in the
trial. At the hearing on February 27,2013, it was discovered that Plaintiffs responses to
discovery (with the exception ofthe CD referred to therein) that were to have been attached to
the fax-filed Affidavit, were not attached. Therefore, on March 5,2013 the Court requested that
the Plaintiff provide, among other things, invoices for materials ordered by the Defendant and
delivered to the Defendant's job sites that the Plaintiff intended to use at trial.
-6-

An additional motion was filed to bring to the Court's attention that on February

8,2005 the corporation of Crestwood Construction, Inc. was dissolved effective as of December
31, 2005. (R, p. 196) After which, Crestwood, Inc. was fonned and then used the assumed
business name of Crestwood Construction, Inc. In other words, an additional issue of fact arose,
namely, the dissolution of Crestwood Construction, Inc. and a new entity altogether doing
business after February 11, 2005. It is important to note that initially, when the Complaint was
filed in this matter, it was seeking for payment on an open account, not on the personal guaranty.
That is the reason why the Answer to the Complaint indicated that the Statute of Limitations had
run. After that, the action changed from that of collecting on a personal account to collecting on
a guarantor, which would have changed the Statute of Limitations from four years to five years
meaning that the transaction in question was, in fact, not barred by the Statute of Limitations.

II.

STANDARD OFREVIE'V

An appeal from an order of summary judgment is reviewed by the Court under the

same standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Purdy v.

Farmers Ins. Co. a/Idaho, 138 Idaho 443,445,65 P.3d 184,186 (2003). Under that standard all
facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences
are to be drawn in favor ofthe non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is only appropriate if
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, show that there is no genuine issue
relating to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Id.
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If there is no disputed issues of material fact, then the Court exercises free review over the
remaining questions oflaw. !d.

III.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The Court Erred in Granting SUlmnary Judgment \Vhen it Failed to Require More
Evidence Than the Opinion of a \Vitness as to the Amount \Vithout More
Supporting Documentation.

B.

The COUli Erred \Vhen it Allowed the Judgment to be Amended to Include
Interest.

C.

The Court Erred When it Denied the Defendant's Motion to Reconsider.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment When it Failed to Require More
Evidence Than the Opinion of a Witness as to the Amount Without More
Supporting Documentation.
The relevance of all of such is that Franklin Building Supply was attempting to

collect on a guaranty a very large debt, specifically, approximately $700,000. In attempting to
collect that debt, it filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with an Affidavit that merely provided
a summary and then an amount for each of the twenty accounts and totaled them as to bring
about the claim that was owed. An affidavit supporting a motion for summary judgment must be
made on personal knowledge and show that the affiant is competent to testify to the material
contained therein. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e). The Rule further states that the "court may permit
affidavits to be ... opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits." Id.
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In tlus case, Rule 56( e) raises two issues. First, since the amount in question was based upon
invoices, the Court should have granted the defendant the opportunity to depose the affiant who
filed the Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. Second, nothing in the
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment indicates that Mr. Pietrucci (the affiant)
has personal knowledge that the items listed on the Customer Transaction Report actually
correspond to goods that were actually delivered to Defendant. Defendant should have been
allowed to opportunity to depose Mr. Pietrucci, so that it could be determined whether in fact
each ofthe summaries of open accounts, twenty in nature, were in fact all incurred by Crestwood
Construction, Inc. The Court declined to do so. Also, no evidence was presented that would
indicate the Mr. Pietrucci in fact personally knew if those invoices corresponded to items
actually delivered to Crestwood Construction Inc., or to some other entity. A further issue of fact
arises because the Credit Application required that only certain people were authorized
purchasers, namely, Chris Georgson, Justin Walker and Aaron Hymas. No evidence was
presented to show that, in fact, had occurred. If the contents of an affidavit could not be within
the affiant's personal knowledge they are not cognizable under Rule 56(e). Resource Engr., Inc.
v. Nancy Lee Mines, Inc., 714 P.2d 526,528 (Idaho App. 1985). Thus, in this case summary

judgment was not appropriate since the Defendant was not given the 0ppOliunity to depose the
affiant and no supporting evidence was provided that the affiant had personal knowledge relating
to the invoices relied upon to determine the amount Defendant owed.
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Furthermore, the Request for Production of Documents included that the Court
should consider the invoices since, ultimately, the responses of the Plaintiff would be used at
trial. It is hard to understand while they were not used in the summary judgment, but felt they
were needed in trial. Rule 56 states that sUlmnary judgment is only appropriate when there are
no genuine issues of material fact in the case. Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, the invoices
(which were not considered at summary judgment) give rise to some factual issues. First, the
information contained in the invoices is particularly important since they refer to 20 different
accounts at 10 or 20 different locations and no evidence was provided showing that the
Defendant did in fact receive those items listed on the invoices. Second, there is the addition
issue of whether in fact the alleged purchases were authorized by one of the three individual
authorized to do so. By not having fleshed out these facts, the trial court left some material
factual disputes dangling, which should be addressed by a trier of fact.
Added to all ofthat is what effect, if any, it had on the Credit Application for the
personal guaranty of the Defendant that Crestwood Construction, Inc. was dissolved. Said
dissolution having occuned before it appears any of the charges at issue here were incuned and
after the credit application was signed. Thus, a new entity, Crestwood Inc., was fonned, which is
altogether a different entity than Crestwood Construction, Inc. Crestwood Inc., then began using
the assumed business name of Crestwood Construction, Inc. In other words, there was no credit
application filed with respect to the existing entity and, thus, no guaranty of the obligation.
Furthermore, it is important to note that as one looks at the different invoices CR, pp. 23-51), the
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invoices were all in the name of Crestwood Construction, and Aaron Hymas did not guaranty
Crestwood Construction but only Crestwood Construction, Inc. TIms creating an addition factual
issue and another reason why the trial court en-ed by granting summary judgment. Thus looking
at the amount of money at issue in this case (over $700,000) there are significant material facts in
disputes which would justify this matter being tried.

B.

The Court Erred \Vhen it Allowed the Judgment to be Amended to Include Interest.
When sUlmnary judgment was sought, it was sought for the original amount and

the Court granted that amount. Thereafter, it was improper for the Court to allow that amount to
be corrected and add the interest. Once that interest was added, it should have been added only
at the contract rate of 12% and not 18%. Idaho Code § 28-22-104.

C.

The Court Erred When it Denied the Defendant's Motion to Reconsider.
In addition to what has previously been demonstrated, additional issues were in fact

presented to the Court. Specifically, showing what the Plaintiffs Production of Documents
provided and additional information that should have suggested to the trial court the genuine
issues of material fact existed and it should not have granted summary judgment in the matter.
V.

ATTORNEY FEES

Since this is a cOlmnercial transaction, the Court should grant attorney fees under
Idaho Code § 12-120.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

This case should be remanded in its entirety to the District Court to detennine the
correct amount of the indebtedness of Defendant, for Franklin Building Supply to show that a
debt is in fact owed by Crestwood Construction, Inc., and if Aaron Hymas is in fact a guaranty of
that particular debt.
DATED this 22 nd day of January, 2014.
ROBINSON & TRIBE

By:

R

,g~ 7' ~/C:-::~

Brent T. Robinson
Attomeys for Defendant!Appellant

- 12-

CERTIFICAT,J: OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on th~<:'vCray of January, 2014, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and addressed to the following:

0' U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Facsimile 208-344-8542
DE-mail dswartley@eberle.com
D Special Handling _ _ _ __

David M. Swartley, Esq.
EBERLE BERLIN KADING
TURJ\TBOW & MeKLVEEN

P. O. Box l368
Boise, Idaho 83701

Brent T. Robinson

- l3 -

